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Stochastic cooperative games in
insurance and reinsurance
JEROEN SUIJS1 ANJA DE WAEGENAERE1 PETER BORM1
Abstract
This paper shows how problems in ‘non life’-insurance and ‘non life’-reinsurance
can be modelled simultaneously as cooperative games with stochastic payoffs. Pareto
optimal allocations of the risks faced by the insurers and the insureds are determined.
It is shown that the core of the corresponding insurance games is nonempty. Moreover,
it is shown that specific core allocations are obtained when the zero utility principle is
used for calculating premiums. Finally, game theory is used to give a justification for
subadditive premiums.
KEYWORDS: (re)insurance, zero utility principle, cooperative game theory, Pareto
optimality, core.




Classical actuarial theory has mainly focused on insurance problems from the insurer’s
point of view. Most of the attention is dedicated to the determination of an appropriate
premium for the insured risk. Obviously, the nature of the risk is a substantial factor in
this process. In this respect, there is an important difference whether the risk arises from
the ‘life’ or the ‘non life’ sector. For the first, there is a profusion of statistical data on the
expected remaining life available, which makes the calculation of an appropriate premium
relatively easy. For the latter, however, things are a bit more complicated. In ‘non life’
insurance the risk is not always easy to capture in a statistical framework. Therefore, several
premium calculation principles have been developed to serve this purpose, see for instance
Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck (1984).
These calculation principles, however, only take into account a part of the insurer’s
side of the deal. More precisely, they consider whether the premium is high enough to
cover the risk. Competition arising from the presence of other insurers on the one hand,
and the interests of the insured, on the other hand, are at least to a large extent ignored. It
is, of course, better to consider all these aspects in an insurance deal, since the premium
should not only be high enough to compensate the insurer for bearing the individual’s risk,
it should also be low enough so that an individual is willing to insure his risk (or a part of it)
for this premium. The economic models for (re)insurance markets, which were developed
from the 1960’s on (cf. Borch (1962a) and Bühlmann (1980), (1984)), consider indeed the
interests of both the insurers and the insureds. These models incorporate the possibility to
study problems concerning fairness, Pareto optimality and market equilibrium. Bühlmann
(1980), for example, shows that the Esscher calculation principle results in a Pareto optimal
outcome.
More recently, also game theory is used to model the interests of all parties in an
insurance problem. Cooperative game theory focuses on the gains arising in multi person
interactive decision situations when a part of the population decides to cooperate. The
primary concerns are which coalitions ultimately form and how to divide the gains among
the members of each coalition formed. This theory finds many applications in, for example,
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cost allocation (cf. Moulin (1988)) and combinatorial optimization problems (cf Tijs
(1992)). Cost allocation problems arise when several groups of people with possibly
different interests are involved in a joint project. The problem is then who pays what part of
the total costs. A well known example of such a problem was faced by the Tennessee Valley
Authority in the US during the 1930’s. Briefly spoken, this project was designed to control
the course of the Tennessee river. The problem was how the costs should be allocated
to the groups that benefited from the project (see Ransmeier (1942)). In combinatorial
optimization one can think of the construction of a network to connect households to an
electrical powerplant such that everybody is supplied with electricity. Problems that arise
here are which network to construct and how to allocate the costs of it.
Besides the applications just mentioned, cooperative game theory has been applied
in insurance problems. Especially when insurance companies incorporate subadditive
premiums, individuals can save on the premium if they decide to take a collective insurance
instead of an individual one. This situation is discussed in Alegre and Mercè Claramunt
(1995). Other applications of cooperative game theory in insurance can be found in Borch
(1962b) and Lemaire (1991).
Cooperative game theory, however, still has to establish itself as an appropriate tool
for exploring insurance problems. A reason for this is due to the inability of traditional
cooperative game theory to incorporate the uncertainties, which play such an important
role in insurance. Indeed, in classical theory the gains coalitions can obtain by cooperating
are assumed to be known with certainty. Recently, however, Suijs, Borm, De Waegenaere
and Tijs (1995) introduced a model, which overcomes this problem. They introduced
cooperative games, which allow that the gains coalitions can make are random variables.
This paper shows how the abovementioned game theoretical model can be applied to
examine problems in insurance. The model we introduce incorporates insurance of personal
losses as well as reinsurance of the portfolios of insurance companies. By cooperating with
insurance companies individual persons are able to transfer their future random losses to
the cooperating insurance companies. Thus, in doing so, individual persons conclude an
insurance deal. Similarly, by cooperating with other insurers an insurance company can
transfer (parts of) her insurance portfolio to the other insurers. So, the insurance company
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concludes a reinsurance deal.
In this model our attention is focused on Pareto optimal allocations of the risks, and
on the question which premiums are fair to charge for these risk exchanges. A Pareto
optimal allocation is such that there exists no other allocation which is better for all
persons and insurers taking part in the game. We show that there is essentially a unique
Pareto optimal allocation of risk. It will appear that this Pareto optimal allocation of the
risk is independent of the insurance premiums that are paid for these risk exchanges. For
determining fair premiums, we look at the ’core’ of the reinsurance game. A core allocation
divides the gains of cooperation in such a way that no subcoalition has an incentive to split
off. We show that the core is nonempty for insurance games. Moreover, we show that the
zero utility principle for calculating premiums (see Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck
(1984)) results in a core allocation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce insurance games. We
indicate which allocations are Pareto optimal and show that the core of reinsurance games
is nonempty. In particular, we prove that the zero utility principle for calculating premiums
results in a core allocation. In Section 3 we use game theory to explain why subaddi-
tive premiums are attractive for insurance companies. Finally, Section 4 provides some
concluding remarks.
2 Insurance games
This section models insurance problems as cooperative games with stochastic payoffs as
introduced in Suijs et al. (1995). We show that by cooperating, individuals and insurers can
redistribute their risks and, consequently, improve their welfare. First, we need to specify
the players of the game. A player can be one of two types. A player is either an individual
person or an insurer. The set of individual persons is denoted byNP and the set of insurers
is denoted by NI . Hence, the players of the game are denoted by the set NI [NP .
Next, all players are assumed to be risk averse expected utility maximizers. This means
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that a player prefers one risk to another if the expected utility of the first exceeds the expected
utility of the latter. Note that insurers are also assumed to be risk averse. Furthermore,
we assume that the utility function for each player i 2 NI [ NP can be described by
ui(t) = ie
 it, (t 2 IR), with i < 0, i > 0. Since i < 0 and i > 0 imply concavity
for the utility functions ui, we have that each player is risk averse. So, for each random
loss X this means that a player prefers receiving the expected loss E(X) with certainty to
receiving the random loss X . Moreover, the absolute measure of risk aversion for player i
is constant and equals i. Hence, player i is more risk averse than player j if i > j . By
changing the signs of the parameters i and i the utility function becomes convex, and, as
a consequence, the player will be risk loving. Regarding the situations where one or more
risk neutral/loving insurers are involved we confine ourselves to a brief discussion later on.
Finally, note that since the utility functions are exponential that the expected utility of a
random loss X need not always exist. In this paper, however, we implicitly assume that the
risks are such that the expected utility exists.
To describe the future random losses of a player, we introduce the following notation.
Let fYk  Exp(k)jk 2 Kg be a finite collection of independent exponentially distributed
random variables. These variables can be interpreted as describing the random losses that
could occur to individuals. They describe, for example, the monetary damages caused by





where 0  fik  1 for all k 2 K. In particular we define Kj = fk 2 Kjfjk 6= 0g for
all j 2 NI [ NP . So, if player i is an insurer the loss Xi represents the loss of insurer
i’s portfolio. Moreover, the insurance portfolio Xi can be a combination of many random
losses. In fact, they are the fractions fik of the losses that individuals have insured at this
particular insurer. If player i is an individual person then Xi represents the random loss
this individual might want to insure. Note that the portfolios of different players may be
stochastically dependent, albeit in a very specific way. Indeed, an individual can insure
part of his loss at insurer i and another part of the same loss at insurer j.
Now, let us focus on the possibilities that occur when players decide to cooperate.
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Therefore, consider a coalition S of players. If the members of S decide to cooperate,
the total loss XS 2 L1(IR) of the coalition equals the sum of the individual losses of the
members of S, i.e., XS =
P
i2S Xi. Subsequently, the loss XS has to be allocated to the
members of S.
In allocating the loss XS we distinguish the following three cases. In the first case,
coalition S consists of insurers only. So, S  NI . Such a coalition is assumed to allocate
the loss XS in the following way. First, a coalition S allocates a fraction rij 2 [0; 1] of the
loss Xj of insurer j 2 S to insurer i 2 S. So, insurer i bears a total loss of
P
j2S rijXj ,
where rij 2 [0; 1] and
P
k2S rkj = 1. This is called proportional reinsurance. This part
of the allocation of XS for coalition S can be described by a matrix R 2 IR
SS
+ , where
rij represents the fraction insurer i bears of insurer j’s loss Xj . Second, the insurers are
allowed to make deterministic transfer payments. This means that each insurance company
i 2 S also receives an amount di 2 IR such that
P
j2S dj = 0. These transfer payments can
be interpreted as the aggregate premium insurers have to pay for the actual risk exchanges.
In the second case, coalition S consists of individual persons only. So, S  NP . Then
the gains of cooperation are assumed to be nil. That is, we do not allow any risk exchanges
between the persons themselves. For, that is what the insurers are for in the first place.
As a result, the only allocations (d;R) of XS which are allowed are of the form rii = 1
for all i 2 S and rij = 0 for all i; j 2 S with i 6= j. If, however, one wants to allow
risk exchanges by the individual persons then the resulting situation is similar to the case
where only insurance companies cooperate. Consequently, allocations can be described in
the same way.
In the third and last case, coalition S consists of both insurers and individual persons.
So, S  NI [ NP . Now cooperation can take place in two different ways. First, insurers
are allowed to exchange (parts of) their portfolios with other insurers. Second, individual
persons may transfer (parts of) their risks to insurers. Again, individual persons are not
allowed to exchange risks with each other. Moreover, we assume that insurers cannot
transfer (parts of) their portfolios to individuals.
Summarizing we can say that there a several restrictions on allocations. To be more
precise, denote by SI the set of insurers of coalition S, i.e., SI = S \NI , and by SP the set
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of individuals of coalition S, i.e., SP = S \ NP . Then an allocation (d;R) 2 IR
S  IRSS+
is feasible for the coalition S if for all i 2 SP and all j 2 S with i 6= j it holds that rij = 0
and
P
i2S rij = 1 for all j 2 S. Finally, we denote byZ(S) the set of all feasible allocations
for S.
Example 2.1 Let NI = f1; 2g, NP = f4; 5g and K = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g. So, there are five
independent exponentially distributed risks. Next, suppose that X1 = 13Y1 + Y2, X2 =
1
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Y1 + Y3, X4 = Y4 and X5 = Y5. Consider the coalition S = f1; 4; 5g. Then XS =
X1 + X4 + X5 = 13Y1 + Y2 + Y4 + Y5. A feasible allocation for S is the following. Let
d = (3; 2; 1) and r11 = 1, r14 = 12 , r44 = 12 , r15 = 15 and r55 = 45 . Then insurer 1 receives
(d;R)1 = 3   (X1 + 12X4 +
1
5









and individual 5 receives




So, individuals 4 and 5 pay a premium of 2 and 1, respectively, to insurer 1 for the insurance
of their losses.
In conclusion, an insurance game   with player set NI [ NP is described by the tuple
(NI [ NP ; (XS)SNI[NP ; (ui)i2NI[NP ), where NI is the set of insurers, NP the set of
individuals, XS 2 L1(IR) the random loss for coalition S, and ui the utility function for
player i 2 NI [NP . Recall thatXS =
P
i2S Xi for all S  NI [NP and that all players are
constant absolute risk averse expected utility maximizers. The class of all such insurance
games with insurers NI and individuals NP is denoted by IG(NI ; NP ).
2.1 Pareto optimal distributions of risk
Since the preferences of both an individual and an insurer are described by means of a
utility function we can look at the deterministic (or certainty) equivalent of random payoffs
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for each of them. The deterministic equivalent of a random payoff is the amount of money
for which a player is indifferent between receiving the random payoff and receiving this
amount of money with certainty. For the utility functions considered in our model, we can
define the deterministic equivalent of a random payoff X by mi(X) = u
 1
i (E(ui(X)))
provided that the expected utility exists. Then for all these random payoffs X it holds that
E(ui(mi(X)) = ui(mi(X)) = E(ui(X)). Since the expected utilities equal each other,
player i is indifferent between the random payoff X and the deterministic payoff mi(X).
Moreover, for the insurance games introduced in this section the deterministic equivalent
is such that the results stated in Suijs and Borm (1996) can be applied. One of their results
concerns the Pareto optimality1 of an allocation. For insurance games this result reads as
follows.
Proposition 2.2 Let   2 IG(NI ; NP ) and S  NI [NP . An allocation (d;R) 2 Z(S) is







mi(( ~d; ~R)i): (2)
So, an allocation is Pareto optimal for coalitionS if and only if this allocation maximizes
the sum of the deterministic equivalents. To determine these allocations, we first need to
calculate the deterministic equivalent of an allocation (d;R) for S for player i 2 S.
Therefore, let S  NI [ NP and (d;R) 2 Z(S). The random loss coalition S has to
allocate equals XS =
P
i2S Xi. Given a feasible allocation (d;R) 2 Z(S), the random
payoff to player i 2 S equals




if i 2 SI and
(d;R)i = di   riiXi
1An allocation (d;R) of the loss XS is Pareto optimal for coalition S if there exists no feasible allocation
( ~d; ~R) of XS such that each member of S is better off, i.e., E(ui(( ~d; ~R)i)) > E(ui((d;R)i)) for all i 2 S.
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; if i 2 SI :
(3)
































Hence the sum of deterministic equivalents is independent of the vector of transfer
payments d. Intuitively, this is quite clear. Indeed, an increase in di for player i implies
that dj decreases for at least one other player j since
P
h2S dh = 0. Consequently, Pareto
optimality is solely determined by the choice of the allocation risk exchange matrix R of
the random losses. In fact, the next theorem shows that there is a unique allocation risk
exchange matrix R inducing Pareto optimality.
Theorem 2.3 Let   2 IG(NI ; NP ) and S  NI [ NP . An allocation (d;R) 2 Z(S) is















, if i 2 SI [ fjg and j 2 SP ;
0 , otherwise:
































rij = 1; for all j 2 SP ;P
i2SI
rij = 1; for all j 2 SI ;
rii  0; if i 2 SP ;
rij  0; if i 2 SI and j 2 S:
2The proof is stated in the Appendix.
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Since the objective function is strictly concave in rij for all relevant combinations of
i; j 2 S, it is sufficient to prove that R solves this maximization problem. The Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions3 tell us that this is indeed the case if there exists j 2 IR (j 2 S),














= j   ij; for all i 2 SI and all j 2 S;
iirii = 0; for all i 2 SP ;
ijrij = 0; for all i 2 SI and all j 2 S:
























; for all j 2 SI :
Consequently, R solves the maximization problem. 2
So, for a Pareto optimal allocation of a loss Xj within S one has to distinguish between
two cases. In the first case the index j refers to an insurer and in the second case j
refers to an individual. When Xj is the loss of insurer j 2 SI , the loss is allocated
proportionally to 1
i
among all insurers in coalition S. When Xj is the loss of individual
j 2 SP , the loss is allocated proportionally to 1i among all insurers in coalition S and
individual j himself. Note that by the feasibility constraints nothing is allocated to the
3 The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions read as follows:
If f(x) = maxy f(y)
s.t. gk(y)  0; k 2 K
gl(y) = 0; l 2 L
then there exist k  0 (8k 2 K) and l 2 IR (8l 2 L) such that
rf(x) =
P
k2K k  rgk(x) +
P
l2L l  rgl(x)
k  gk(x) = 0, for all k 2 K:
Moreover, if f is strictly concave and gk (k 2 K), gl (l 2 L) are convex then the reverse of the statement also
holds and the maximum is unique.
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other individuals. Moreover, the less risk averse a player is, the larger his share in the
risk will be. Furthermore, Pareto optimality does not depend on the parameters k of the
losses Yk (k 2 K). Finally, remark that if only reinsurance of the insurance portfolios is
considered, that is, NP = ; then the Pareto optimal allocation coincides with the Pareto
optimal allocation of (re)insurance markets discussed in Bühlmann (1980).
Example 2.4 In this example all monetary amounts can be assumed to be in thousands
of dollars. Consider the following situation in automobile insurance with three insurance
companies and two individual persons. So, NI = f1; 2; 3g and NP = f4; 5g. The utility
function of each player can be described by ui(t) = e it with 1 = 0:33, 2 = 0:1,
3 = 0:25, 4 = 0:4 and 5 = 0:25, respectively. So insurer 2 is the least risk averse player
and individual 4 is the most risk averse player. Each insurance company bears the risk of all
the cars contained in its insurance portfolio. A car can be one of two types. The first type
corresponds to an average saloon car which generates relatively low losses. The second
type corresponds to an exclusive sportscar generating relatively high losses. Formally, the
monetary loss generated by a car is described by the exponential probability distribution
Exp(5) when it is of type 1 and by Exp(0:5) when it is of type 2. Thus the expected loss of
a type 1 car and a type 2 car equal $ 0:2 and $ 2, respectively.
The insurance portfolio of insurer 1 consists of 1800 cars of type 1 and 10 cars of type
2. For insurer 2 the portfolio consists of 900 cars of type 1 and 25 cars of type 2. Finally,
the portfolio of insurer 3 consists of 300 cars of type 1 and 90 cars of type 2. The expected
loss for insurer 1 then equals 1800  0:2 + 10  2 = $ 380. The expected losses for insurer
2 and 3 then equal $ 230 and $ 240, respectively. The two individual persons each possess
one car. Player 4’s car is of type 1 and player 5’s car is of type 2. So, the expected losses
are $ 0:2 and $ 2, respectively.
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Next, let Xi denote the loss of player i. If all players cooperate, the Pareto optimal risk
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Consequently, a Pareto optimal allocation (d;R) yields the payoffs












(d;R)4 = d4   539X4;
(d;R)5 = d5   421X5:
The determination of the allocation risk exchange matrix is, of course, only one part
of the allocation. We still have to determine the vector of transfer payments d, that is, the
premiums that have to be paid. Although an allocation (d;R) may be Pareto optimal for
any choice of d, not every d is satisfactory from a social point of view. An insurer will not
agree with insuring the losses of other players if he is not properly compensated, that is, if
he does not receive a fair premium for the insurance. Similarly, insurance companies and
individuals only agree to insure their losses if the premium they have to pay is reasonable.
Consequently, there is a conflict of interests; both insurance companies and individuals
want to pay a low premium for insuring their own losses, while insurance companies want
to receive a high premium for bearing the losses of other players. So the question remains
which premiums are reasonable? This is the subject of the next subsection.
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2.2 The core of insurance games
In our quest for fair premiums we look at core allocations of insurance games. The core
is one of the most important solution concepts in game theory. It is generally accepted by
game theorists that if the core is a nonempty set of allocations, then the allocation on which
the players agree should be a core allocation. The core contains allocations that induce a
form of stability for the coalition of all players involved. For a more general discussion of
the core we refer to Aumann (1961) and Scarf (1967). In the context of insurance games, an
allocation is a core allocation if there is no subcoalition that wants to part company with the
grand coalition NI [NP because this subcoalition can acheive a better allocation on their
own. Formally, this means that an allocation (d;R) of NI [ NP is a core allocation if for
each coalition S  NI [NP there exists no allocation ( ~d; ~R) for S such that each player i
prefers the payoff ( ~d; ~R)i to the payoff (d;R)i, i.e., E(ui(( ~d; ~R)i)) > E(ui((d;R)i)) for all
i 2 S. The set of all core allocations for a game   2 IG(NI ; NP ) is denoted by Core( ).
Note that a core allocation is Pareto optimal forNI[NP . Hence, (d;R) 2 Core( ) implies
that the allocation risk exchange matrixR has the structure of the Pareto optimal allocation
risk exchange matrix R as described in Theorem 2.3 with S = NI [ NP .
We will show that the core of an insurance game is nonempty. So, there always exists
an allocation of NI [NP which is stable in the sense described above. To prove this result,
we make use of the results stated in Suijs and Borm (1996).
First, we associate with each insurance game   2 IG(NI ; NP ) a cooperative game
  2 IG(NI ; NP ) with deterministic payoffs. This means that the payoff of a coalition
in the game   is a real number instead of a random variable. The game   is called the
deterministic equivalent of  .






The payoff xS is based on Proposition 2.2, which states that an allocation is Pareto optimal
for S if and only if the sum of the corresponding deterministic equivalents equals xS . The
game   is then described by   = (NI [NP ; (xS)SNI[NP ; (ui)i2NI[NP ). The following
result is a consequence of Theorem 3.1 in Suijs and Borm (1996).
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Proposition 2.5 Let   2 IG(NI ; NP ) be an insurance game and let   be its deterministic
equivalent. Then
Core( ) 6= ; if and only if Core( ) 6= ;:
Moreover, let (d;R) be an allocation of NI [ NP and let y 2 IR
NI[NP be such that
mi((d;R)i) = yi for all i 2 NI [NP . Then
(d;R) 2 Core( ) if and only if y 2 Core( ):
So, to prove nonemptiness of the core of insurance games it is sufficient to prove that
the core of the corresponding deterministic equivalent is nonempty. Since y 2 Core( )
if and only if
P
i2NI[NP
yi = xNI[NP and
P
i2S yi  xS for all S  NI [ NP we can
apply the Bondareva Shapley Theorem to check nonemptiness of the core. Therefore, let
 : 2NI[NP ! IR+ be a map assigning to each coalition S  NI [ NP a nonnegative
number (S). Such a map is called a balanced map if
P
SNI[NP :i2S
(S) = 1 for all
i 2 NI [ NP . The Bondareva Shapley Theorem applied to insurance games then reads as
follows (see Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967)).
Proposition 2.6 Let   2 IG(NI ; NP ) and let   be its deterministic equivalent. Then
Core( ) 6= ; if and only if for all balanced maps  : 2NI[NP ! IR+ it holds that
X
SNI[NP
(S)xS  xNI[NP :
Theorem 2.7 Let   2 IG(NI ; NP ). Then Core( ) 6= ;.
PROOF: First, recall thatKj = fk 2 Kjfjk 6= 0g for all j 2 NI[NP . Then forS  NI[NP

















































































































































where the second equality follows from Theorem 2.3 and expression (4). Next, let



















































































































































































































(S) = 1 for all j 2 NI [NP . Applying Proposition 2.5 and Propo-
sition 2.6 then completes the proof. 2
Example 2.8 Consider the situation described in Example 2.4. In order to calculate the
deterministic equivalent of this insurance game, note that since fjk = 1 for all k 2 Kj and












































for all S  NI [ NP (cf. expression (6)). Hence, we get




Similarly, one can calculate the value xS for each coalition S. These values are presented
in Table 1.
S xS S xS S xS
f1g  405:52 f2; 5g  239:77 f2; 3; 4g  490:11
f2g  237:61 f3; 4g  311:28 f2; 3; 5g  492:03
f3g  311:08 f3; 5g  313:38 f2; 4; 5g  239:97
f4g  0:21 f4; 5g  2:98 f3; 4; 5g  313:58
f5g  2:77 f1; 2; 3g  869:53 f1; 2; 3; 4g  869:73
f1; 2g  620:21 f1; 2; 4g  620:41 f1; 2; 3; 5g  871:63
f1; 3g  661:65 f1; 2; 5g  622:34 f1; 2; 4; 5g  622:14
f1; 4g  405:72 f1; 3; 4g  661:85 f1; 3; 4; 5g  664:06
f1; 5g  407:88 f1; 3; 5g  663:86 f2; 3; 4; 5g  492:23
f2; 3g  489:91 f1; 4; 5g  408:08 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g  871:83
f2; 4g  237:81
TABLE I: The deterministic equivalent  .
The core of this game is then defined by








Next, note that for a Pareto optimal allocation (d;R) of NI we have that
m1((d;R
)1) = d1   153:77;
m2((d;R
)2) = d2   512:59;
m3((d;R
)3) = d3   205:04;
m4((d;R
)4) = d4   0:03;
m5((d;R
)5) = d5   0:40:
Next, take d0 = ( 229:65; 278:33; 46:81; 0:17; 1:70). Then the resulting payoffs
equal mi((d0; R)i)i2f1;2;3;4;5g = ( 383:42; 234:26; 251:85; 0:20; 2:10). It is easy
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to check that this allocation is in the core of the deterministic equivalent  . Hence,
(d0; R) 2 Core( ).
So, since the core is nonempty, we know that if all players cooperate then there exist
allocations such that this cooperation is stable. Moreover, from the Pareto optimality of a
core allocation it follows that the allocation risk matrix is uniquely determined. A similar
argument, however, does not hold for the alloction transfer payments (i.e., the premiums that
have to be paid). Since the number of core allocations will mostly be infinite, the number of
premiums resulting in a core allocation will also be infinite. Consequently, the insurers still
have to agree on the premiums that have to be paid. A possibility is considering existing
premium calculation principles and check if they result in core allocations for insurance
games. This approach is elaborated in the next subsection.
2.3 The zero utility principle
Premium calculation principles indicate how to determine the premium for a certain risk. In
the past, various of these principles were designed, for example, the net premium principle,
the expected value principle, the standard deviation principle, the Esscher principle, and
the zero utility principle (cf. Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck (1984)). In this
section we focus on the zero utility principle. A premium calculation principle determines
a premium i(X) for individual i for bearing the risk X . The zero utility principle assigns
a premium i(X) to X such that the utility level of individual i, who bears the risk X ,
remains unchanged when the wealthwi of this individual changes towi+i(X) X . Since
individuals are expected utility maximizers this means that the premium i(X) satisfies
ui(wi) = E(ui(wi + i(X)  X)). Note that the premium of the risk X depends on the
individual who bears this risk and his wealth wi.
Now, let us return to insurance games and utilize the zero utility principle to determine
the allocation transfer payments d 2 IRNI[NP . At first this might seem difficult since
the zero utility principle requires initial wealths wi which do not appear in our model
of insurance games. The assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, however, yields
that the zero utility principle is independent of these initial wealths wi. To see this, let
19
  2 RG(NI ; NP ) be an insurance game. Since utility functions are exponential we can
rewrite the expression ui(wi) = E(ui(wi + i(X)  X)) as follows
wi = u
 1
i (E(ui(wi + i(X) X))) = wi + i(X) + u
 1
i (E(ui( X))):
Hence, i(X) =  u
 1
i (E(ui( X))) =  mi( X) which indeed is independent of the
wealth wi. Given this expression we can calculate the premium individuals receive for the
















, if i 2 SI [ fjg and j 2 SP ;
0 , otherwise:
Consequently, the risk that insurer i bears equals
P
j2NI[NP
rijXj . The premium he should

































































where the third equality follows from expression (3) with di = 0.









ijXj). As a consequence, we let the premium that
insurer i has to pay for reinsuring the fraction rji of his own portfolioXi at insurer j, equal
20
































Similarly, the premium that individual i 2 NP has to pay for insuring his loss at insurer
j equals the zero utility premium that this insurer wants to receive for bearing this risk.


















Because individuals are not allowed to bear (part of) the risk of any other individual/insurer



















































































































for all i 2 NP .
Example 2.9 Consider again the situation described in Example 2.4. Applying the zero
utility principle gives for insurer 1
d01 =  1200  3 log (1  
1
517
)  115  3 log (1   1
0:517
)  1  3 log (1  2
539
)
 1  3 log (1   1
0:521
) + 1800  10 log (1  1
517
) + 10  10 log (1   1
0:517
)
+1800  4 log (1   1
517
) + 10  4 log (1   1
0:517
)
= 42:60 + 43:18 + 0:03 + 0:30   213:02   12:52   85:21   5:01
=  229:65:
Similarly, we get for insurers 2 and 3 and individuals 4 and 5
d02 = 248:52 + 125:17 + 0:10 + 1:00   31:95   9:39   42:60   12:52 = 278:33
d03 = 127:81 + 17:53 + 0:04 + 0:40   10:65   33:79   35:50   112:65 =  46:81
d04 =  0:03   0:10   0:04 =  0:17
d05 =  0:3   1:00   0:40 =  1:70:
So, d0 = ( 229:65; 278:33; 46:81; 0:17; 1:70). From Example 2.8 we know that the
resulting allocation (d0; R) is in the core of the game.
In Example 2.9 it is seen that the allocation corresponding to the zero utility principle
is a core allocation. The next theorem shows that this is not a coincidence.
Theorem 2.10 Let   2 RG(NI ; NP ). If d0 is the vector of transfer payments determined
by the zero utility premium calculation principle andR is the Pareto optimal risk exchange
matrix then (d0; R) 2 Core( ).
22
PROOF: By Proposition 2.5 it is suffices to show that (mi((d0; R)i))i2NI[NP 2 Core( ).
Hence, we must show that
P
i2S mi((d









































































































































































































































































































where the inequality follows from Lemma A.1 with c = 0. 2
Example 2.11 Consider the insurance game introduced in Example 2.4. Now, let us take
a closer look at the changes in insurer 1’s utility when the allocation (d0; R) is realized.
In the initial situation insurer 1 bears the risk X1 of his own insurance portfolio. The
deterministic equivalent of X1 equals




To allocate the total risk in a Pareto optimal way, insurer 1 bears the fraction r12 = 317 of the
risk X2 of insurer 2. For this risk he receives a premium 1( 317X2) determined by the zero
utility principle. From the definition of the zero utility calculation principle it follows that
24
m1(X1 + 317X2   1(
3
17
X2)) =  405:52. So insurer 1’s welfare does not change when he
insures a part of the risk of insurer 2. A similar argument holds when he insures a part of
the risks of the other players. Hence
m1(X1   317X2 + 1(
3
17






X4 + 1( 639X4) 
3
21
X5 + 1( 321X5)) =  405:52:
The increase in insurer 1’s welfare arises only from the risks 10
17
X1 and 417X1 he transfers to
insurers 2 and 3, respectively. Indeed,
m1( 317   2(
10
17
X1)  3( 417X1) +X1  
3
17
X2 + 1( 317X2) 
3
17







X5 + 1( 321X5)) = m1((d
0; R)1) =  229:65 >  405:52:
The situation described in the example above is subsistent in the definition of the zero
utility principle. This means that the welfare of an insurer always remains the same when
he bears the risk of someone else in exchange for the zero utility principle based premium.
An increase in welfare only arises when he transfers (a part of) his own risk to someone
else. Consequently, the insurers’ welfare does not increase when individuals insure their
losses. Hence, the insurers’ incentives to insure the individuals’ losses is low. To increase
these incentives it may be better to utilize other premium calculation principles. One could,
for example, consider subadditive premiums. In the next section we give another reason
why it could be desirable that insurance companies employ subadditive premiums.
3 Subbaditivity for collective insurances
In the insurance games defined in the previous section individual persons are not allowed to
cooperate; they cannot redistribute the risk amongst themselves. Looking at the individuals’
behaviour in everyday life, this is a justified assumption. People who want to insure
themselves against certain risks do so by contacting insurance companies, pension funds
etc. We show, however, that when this restriction is abandoned then the mere fact that
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risk exchanges could take place between individuals implies that insurance companies have
incentives to employ subadditive premiums. Whether or not such risk exchanges actually
do take place is not important. As a consequence, collective insurances become cheaper
for the individuals.
LetNP be the set of individuals. A premium calculation principle is called subadditive
if for all subsets S; T  NP with S \ T = ; it holds that (XS) + (XT )  (XS[T ).
Here, XS denotes the total loss of the coalition S. So, it is attractive for the individuals to
take a collective insurance, since this reduces the total premium they have to pay.
Next, consider a game with player set NP only where the individuals are allowed
to redistribute their risks. This situation can be described by an insurance game   2
IG(NP ; ;). So, the individuals NP can now insure their losses among each other. Thus,
  = (NP ; (XS)SNP ; (ui)i2NP ). Then we can associate with  the deterministic equivalent






for all S  NP . Note that this maximum is attained for Pareto optimal allocations (d;R)
for coalition S. For this game, the value xS can be interpreted as the maximum premium
coalition S wants to pay for the insurance of the total risk XS . To see this, suppose that the
coalition S can insure the loss XS for a premium (XS) that exceeds the valuation of the
risk XS , that is,  (XS) < xS . Then for each allocation y 2 IR
S of the premium (XS)
there exists an allocation ( ~d;R) 2 Z(S) such that E(ui(( ~d;R)i)) > ui(yi) for all i 2 S.
Indeed, let (d;R) 2 Z(S) be such that
P
i2S mi((d;R
)i) = xS . Define
~di = di  mi((d;R
)i) + yi + 1jSj (xS + (XS)) ;
for all i 2 S. Then by the linearity of mi in ~di (cf. expression (3)) we have for all i 2 S
that
mi(( ~d;R
)i) = yi + 1jSj (xS + (XS)) > yi:
Hence, the members of S prefer the allocation ( ~d;R) of XS to an insurance of XS and
paying the premium (XS). Consequently, they will not pay more for the insurance of the
26
risk XS than the amount  xS. The next theorem shows that this maximum premium  xS
is subadditive, i.e.,  xS   xT   xS[T , or equivalently, xS + xT  xS[T , for all disjoint
subcoalitions S and T of NP .
Theorem 3.1 Let S; T  NP such that S \ T = ;. Then
xS + xT  xS[T :















































for all S  NP . Now, take S; T  NP such that S \ T = ;. We have to show that
xS + xT  xS[T .

























































































































where the second and the fourth equality follow from S \T = ; and the inequaltiy follows
















Recall that insurers do not benefit from insuring the risks of the individuals when
utilizing the additive zero utility principle; this premium calculation principle yields the
lowest premium for which insurers still want to exchange risks with the individuals (cf.
Example 2.11). So, from a social point of view, it might be best to adopt a middle course
and look for premiums where both insurers and individuals benefit from the insurance
transaction. Interesting questions then remaining are: are these premiums additive or
subadditive and do they yield core allocations?
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper (re)insurance problems are modelled as cooperative games with stochastic
payoffs. In fact, we defined a game that dealt with both the insurance and the reinsurance
problem simultaneously. We showed that there is only one allocation risk exchange matrix
yielding a Pareto optimal distribition of the losses and that a core allocation results when
insurance premiums are calculated according to the zero utility principle. Moreover, we
explained why subadditive premium calculation principles might be attractive to use for
insurance companies.
An issue only briefly mentioned in this paper concerns the insurers’ behaviour. What
if an insurer is risk neutral or risk loving instead of risk averse? Thus, there is at least
one insurer whose utility function is linear or of the form ui(t) = ie it (t 2 IR) with
i > 0, i < 0. Although the proofs are not provided here, most of the results presented
in this paper still hold for these situations. This means that the corresponding games have
nonempty cores and that the zero utility principle still yields a core allocation. The result
28
that does change is the Pareto optimal allocation of the risk. The allocations that are Pareto
optimal when all insurers are risk averse are not Pareto optimal anymore when one or more
insurers happen to be risk loving. In fact, they are the worst possible allocations of the
risk one can think of. In that case, allocating all the risk to the most risk loving insurer
is Pareto optimal. This would actually mean that only one insurance company is needed,
since other insurance companies will ultimately reinsure their complete portfolios at this
most risk loving insurer.
We conclude with some topics for further research. Maybe most interesting is consid-
ering problems in ‘life’-insurance instead of ‘non life’-insurance, which was the subject
of this research. Other topics concern the premium calculation principles: are there other
premium calculation principles than the zero utility principle that result in core allocations?










for x > 1 and c  0. Then f is a non decreasing function in x.



















































where the inequality follows from log(x)  1   1
x











for x > 1 and c  0. Then f is a non increasing function with f(x)  1 for all x > 1.
PROOF: Since limx!1 f(x) = e 1e1 = 1 it is sufficient to prove that f is non increasing in




































































x  1   (x+ c  1)








(x  1)(x+ c  1)
+ log
 
x2 + cx  x













(x  1)(x+ c  1)
+
c
x2 + cx  x  c
=
 c





where the first inequality follows from log(1 + x)  x and the second inequality follows
from x > 1 and c  0. 2

















































































where the fourth equality follows from the independence of the random losses Yk ,
(k 2 K). Since we implicitly assumed that the expected utility exists, we must have
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that k   irijfjk > 0 for all j 2 S and all k 2 K. Then






































Using rij = 0 for all i 2 SP and all j 2 S with i 6= j gives the desired result. 2
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